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It is 25 years since the posthumous publication of David Marr's book on Vision [1]. Only 35 years old 
when he died, Marr had already dramatically influenced vision research. His book and the series of 
papers that preceded it have had a lasting impact on the way that researchers approach human and 
computer vision.
A review at the time of publication predicted that "Even if no single one of Marr's detailed hypotheses 
ultimately survives...[his] lifework will have been vindicated when neuroscientists cannot understand 
how it was ever possible to doubt the validity of his theoretical maxims." 25 years on, most would 
agree that Marr's recipe for investigating human vision and, in particular, his strategy of dividing the 
problem into different levels of analysis, has become unquestioned. At the time, Binford, Horn, 
Minsky, Papert, Rumelhart and others had been advocating computational modelling as a key to 
understanding the brain's operation but Marr brought a number of different approaches together, made 
testable predictions, provided a framework for tackling challenging neuroscientific questions and 
inspired a generation of young scientists to study the brain and visual processing. 
Born in Essex, England, Marr studied mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge before doing his 
Ph.D. in what would now be called 'computational neuroscience' with Professor G.F. Brindley. His 
doctoral work, expressed in a series of three important papers [2,3,4], tied together detailed anatomical 
data on the cerebellum, neocortex and hippocampus within a computational framework . These are 
fundamental papers in the field, especially his paper on the cerebellum, but Marr now changed his 
focus to vision. He wanted to consider specific algorithms, and the constraints of the real world that 
made them tractable, rather than the processing of neural signals in general. 
One of the central and best known ideas in his book is the suggestion that the visual system generates a 
sequence of increasingly symbolic representations of a scene, progressing from a 'primal sketch' of the 
retinal image, through a '2.5D sketch' to simplified 3D models of objects. In a paper with Ellen Hildreth 
[5], he proposed that information from cells tuned to different spatial frequencies (or scales) is 
combined into 'tokens' that are likely to correspond to real-world entities such as an edge. Although 
there is no convincing evidence that the particular type of combination Marr advocated is carried out in 
the visual system (other proposals have more experimental support [6]), it is a good example of Marr's 
approach. "In the theory of visual processes, the underlying task is to reliably derive properties of the 
world from images of it; the business of isolating constraints that are both powerful enough to allow a 
process to be defined and generally true of the world is a central theme of our inquiry." [1]( p23). 
Today, this approach is normal practice in computer vision and at least a widely accepted mantra in 
biological vision research.
The tokens comprising the primal sketch were, Marr argued, then used as input to further processes 
such as object recognition [7] . Object recognition is one of several areas in which Marr's  specific 
ideas about implementation have not survived well. The current focus in both computer and biological 
vision is on matching of high dimensional view-invariant descriptors of image features [8,9], taking a 
quite different approach from Marr's simplified 3D 'stick figures'.
Of his 'theoretical maxims', the best known is Marr's argument that problems in neuroscience must be 
tackled at a number of different levels: computational theory, algorithm and implementation. 
Computational theory means making explicit the input and output of a process and the constraints that 
would allow the problem to be solved. This analysis must come first, he claimed. The algorithmic level 
describes in more detail how to get from input to output but it should be independent of the 
implementation, the third level.
A good example that Marr used to illustrate the idea of separate computational levels was binocular 
stereopsis. An attractive aspect of this problem is that the input to the process is well defined (the 
difference between two images) and, at least at first glance, so is the output. With his colleague, 
Tomaso Poggio, Marr developed two stereo algorithms [10,11] 
The first of these used a simple network that took as its input the images from the left and right eyes 
and which, through a series of competitive and cooperative interactions, generated a single estimate of 
depth for each point on a surface (see Figure 1). In the input layer of the network there were lots of 
'false matches', where neurons would respond to a bright point in one image and, by chance, quite a 
different (non-corresponding) bright point in the other image.
Figure 1 about here
Neurophysiological studies have shown that neurons at the first stage of binocular processing in the 
cortex (V1) respond to both 'false' and correct matches [12,13]. It is tempting to associate V1 with the 
first layer of the network in Marr and Poggio's model, the stage before false matches are eliminated, 
and then to search for visual areas beyond V1 that have characteristics similar to their output layer. 
Although a number of studies have suggested that responses in other visual areas achieve this to some 
degree [14,15,16,17], the analogy with Marr and Poggio's model is too simplistic. For example, the 
receptive fields of neurons grow larger at each level in the hierarchy, with the finest scale detail 
represented in V1. It seems likely that observers rely on information from neurons in V1 when carrying 
out tasks requiring the finest spatial resolution.  Other evidence suggests that false targets persist in at 
least some of the putative output areas [18,19]. This raises the question of whether areas outside V1 
really are 'output layers' to a cooperative algorithm after all.  If not, do they have any more special a 
role in depth perception than V1?
In their second paper on stereo, Marr and Poggio [11] introduced an idea that would require a very 
different type of implementation. They proposed that the brain stored disparity information in a data 
structure that survived eye movements, the '2.5D sketch'. A bit like the filing system used on a 
computer, with folders and sub-folders, fine scale information about a surface would be stored within 
coarser scale groupings. Their model dealt only with vergence eye movements, which move the eyes 
from one depth plane to another, but a similar idea can be applied to the saccadic eye movements that 
move the eyes around a scene. When the observer's task requires a particular piece of fine scale detail -- 
to thread a needle, for example -- some store like the 2.5D sketch would provide the information 
required to direct the eyes (or attention) to the appropriate location and then access the activity of the 
appropriate fine scale neurons. 
It is hard to see how all this information could be stored in a single visual cortical area, particularly if it 
is to survive large saccadic eye movements as Marr discussed towards the end of his book. Neurons in 
V1 and other visual areas change their pattern of firing as the eyes move, while the 2.5D sketch of the 
object remains constant. If a store of information like this does exist in the visual system, the 
implementation is likely to be something more like a motor plan. In this case, neurons in V1 might 
contribute to stereopsis not simply as an input layer but also as 'output neurons' just like those in higher 
areas. What about the 'false matches' in V1, do these not rule out V1 neurons contributing to 
perception? Not necessarily. A filing system like the 2.5D sketch could help determine which V1 
neurons carry the appropriate information for a certain task, making it unnecessary to 'suppress' the 
firing of neurons responsive to false matches at all. There is some psychophysical evidence consistent 
with this idea [20]. Indeed, if perception involves inferring the state of the world from the available 
evidence, neurons responding to 'false matches' provide valid, informative evidence about the scene 
(for example, indicating that there is repetitive structure in the stimulus).
Binocular vision, then, provides an example in which the computational theory and algorithms that 
Marr set out a quarter of a century ago remain relevant today and still inform arguments about the 
implementation of stereopsis in the brain. Criticism may be raised about details of Marr's proposals. 
For example, in his 2.5D sketch it is unclear what the coordinate frame is that describes the location of 
objects - a tricky but crucial issue. Similar sparse specification and internal inconsistencies have been 
pointed out in Marr's paper on the hippocampus [21]. But these critical comments are minor in the 
context of the prolific and wide-ranging output he achieved in a few years.
Marr's great strength was his capacity to unify ideas: from neurophysiology, anatomy and 
psychophysics to image processing and computer vision. Serious attempts at unification are sorely 
lacking in neuroscience today. Had he lived, Marr would surely be at the centre of a lively debate over 
the best computational framework to describe what the brain does. Marr's three papers on the 
neocortex, hippocampus and cerebellum remain a shining example of an attempt at a grand theory. A 
particular strength in this approach (which is less evident in his later work on vision) was to consider a 
continuous flow of information that includes the outside world in the loop. Recent interest in the role of 
the cerebellum in cognition [22] may provoke interest in modelling visual representations as sensori-
motor loops of this kind. It would be a fitting tribute to Marr's inspirational influence in the field if the 
two sides of his work, on neural networks and visual processing, could be united in a computational 
theory of vision. As 'systems biology' gathers pace, it is well to remember that Marr was one of the first 
to examine the brain as a system. His argument for understanding the brain through computational 
theory and modelling are as relevant as they ever were.
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Figure 1. Eliminating 'false matches' in the stereo correspondence problem. A random dot 
stereogram at the top shows left and right eyes' images for crossed or uncrossed fusion (pair on the left or 
right respectively). Marr and Poggio's [10] proposal for establishing correct correspondences between 
dots in the two eyes' images is illustrated below, using only the dots highlighted in red (and dots from the 
same region of the left eye's image). The algorithm requires matches to be made between dots of the 
same colour, which gives rise to possible correspondences at all the nodes in the network marked by an 
open circle. Neighbouring matches with the same disparity support one another in the network, 
illustrated schematically by the green arrows (in their paper, the support extended farther). At the same 
time, matches along any line of sight (dotted lines) inhibit each other (since a ray reaching the eye must 
have come from only one surface). These constraints are sufficient to eliminate all but the correct 
matches, shown here along the main diagonal.
